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COMMENTS
COMPULSORY ARBITRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA-ITS SCOPE,
EFFECT, APPLICATION, AND LIMITATIONS IN MONTGOMERY AND
DELAWARE COUNTIES--A SURVEY AND ANALYSIS.
The history of American courts in the past decade has been one of
increasing litigation. The ensuing abnormal lapse of time between in-
stitution of suit and final adjudication has been a cause of due concern to
our federal and state governments alike.' The United States Attorney
General's Conference on Court Congestion and Delay in Litigation sum-
marized the problem as follows:
"1. The inordinate lapse of time between the institution of suits
and their final disposition in many of our State and Federal Courts
constitutes a threat to the effective administration of justice in this
country. Excessive delay may result in the denial of reparation for
wrongs. It may force parties into unjust settlements. It involves
the risk that some witnesses may die or otherwise become unavailable
and the virtual certainty that the memories of others will become dim
before legal rights which are dependent upon their testimony can be
resolved. Prolonged and unjustified delay is the major weakness of
our judicial systems today.
2. Unless effective action is undertaken to remedy this serious
situation it may further deteriorate and result in bringing the adminis-
tration of justice in this country into disrepute.
1. "The nation-wide 1956 average for jury cases is 12.1 months from 'first filing'
to trial in the 71 jurisdictions reporting thereon and 10.5 months from 'at issue' to trial
in the 88 jurisdictions reporting thereon. The reports for 1955 showed an average of
11.4 months from 'at issue' to trial. The 1956 reports for non-jury cases shows an
average of 6.5 months from 'first filing' to trial in the 70 jurisdictions reporting thereon
and 4.4 months from 'at issue' to trial in the 85 jurisdictions reporting thereon as
against the 1955 average of 4.6 months from 'at issue' to trial." INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS STUDY, STATE TRIALS COURTS oF GENERAL
JURISDICTION, 1-2 (1956).
The majority of courts report an increase in delay, whether it be from "first
filing" to trial, or from "at issue" to trial. Id. at 5. The Supreme Court, Queens County,
New York reports 46 months delay from "at issue" to trial in trials by jury. Id. at iii.
See also Campbell, Paralyzed Justice: A Threat to Legal Process, The Philadelphia
Inquirer, February 8, 1957, p.3 , col.l.
New York State has attacked the problem by appointing a commission to design
a modern court system. In Pennsylvania, on January 22, 1957 a resolution was intro-
duced in the Senate for the appointment of a committee to investigate the problem of
court congestion in Pennsylvania. Compulsory Arbitration in Pennsylvania, Address by
the Honorable William F. Dannehower, Judicial Conference, Pittsburgh, January, 1957,
at p. 27.
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3. . . . The public with the exception of those who have had
to seek recourse in the courts, is not fully aware that justice is often
unnecessarily slow. It does not know that the administrative machinery
of most of our courts is not geared to keep pace with the tempo of
our times. .",2
In an effort to resolve-the situation existing in Pennsylvania, 3 the General
Assembly, in 1952, amended the existing arbitration laws and attempted to
create an effective method of compulsory arbitration by what is popularly
known as The Compulsory Arbitration Act.4  The several courts of com-
mon pleas were allowed to implement this statute by enacting rules for their
respective counties. By January, 1957, the courts of 43 of the 67 counties
in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania had formulated such rules, 5 and the
experiment with compulsory arbitration in Pennsylvania was well underway.
This Comment is directed toward analyzing the scope, effect, applica-
tion, and limitations of compulsory arbitration in Delaware and Mont-
gomery Counties since its adoption by the courts thereof in the spring of
1955. To aid in this investigation a survey was taken among the members
of the Delaware and Montgomery County bars.6 The results are incor-
porated in this Comment, and summarized in the chart in the Appendix. In
addition interviews were granted to the writers of this Comment regarding
2. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON COURT CONGESTION AND DELAY IN
LITIGATION, REPORT OF THE INITIAL MEETING OP THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, 1 (1957).
3. In Philadelphia County where there was a delay of 10.5 months from "at issue"
to time of trial in jury cases; in Allegheny County the average time reported was 24
months from "at issue" to trial in jury cases; while in Delaware County there was a
delay of only 5 months from "at issue" to trial both in jury and non-jury trials. INSTI-
TUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, CALENDAR STATUS STUDY, STATE TRIAL COURTS OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION, at 6 (1956). In Montgomery County the situation was even
more acute, for ". . . in May, 1955, there was a forced delay of two years from the
filing of a suit until it could be brought to trial." Swartz, Compulsory Arbitration: An
Experiment in Pennsylvania, 42 A.B.A.J. 513 (1956). See also Reynolds, Compulsory
Arbitration in Montgomery County, 19 SHINGLE 77 (1956).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 1-209 (Supp. 1956). The sections dealing specifically
with compulsory arbitration are sections 21-81.
5. Compulsory Arbitration in Pennsylvania, Address by the Honorable William F.
Dannehower, Judicial Conference, Pittsburgh, January, 1957, at p. 14. There is some
question as to whether Philadelphia and Allegheny Counties may adopt compulsory
arbitration, because there exists in each county a court of limited jurisdiction which
disposes of small claims (the municipal court in Philadelphia County, and the county
court in Allegheny County). However the enabling statute does not specifically exclude
either county.
6. Questionnaires were sent to 387 attorneys from both counties, of which 130
were answered and are on file in the offices of the Villanova Law Review. In general,
the attorneys were asked to report on the number of times they participated in arbitra-
tion hearings and in what capacity; the length of time hearings usually lasted; whether
they thought the arbitrator's fee adequate; whether they favored an increase in the
jurisdictional amount and extension of arbitration to real property claims; their opin-
ion of the appeal provision; difficulties encountered in administration of the system;
the effect, if any, the system has had on settlements where an insurance company was in-
volved; whether they would favor bringing their claim before a justice of the peace
or an arbitration board where the jurisdictions overlapped, and; in general, whether
they thought the system was achieving its purpose. As has been stated, the results are
summarized in the chart in the appendix.
[VOL. 2: p. 504
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the implementation and effect of compulsory arbitration in Delaware and
Montgomery Counties.7
I.
THE HISTORY OF ARBITRATION IN PENNSYLVANIA.
Arbitration has had a long history in Pennsylvania. The first act
regarding the subject, the Act of January 12, 1705,8 antedates Pennsyl-
vania's status as a commonwealth. It permitted arbitration by rule of the
court upon agreement of the parties to the action. Following this, the
Act of March 21, 1806,1 allowed the parties to a dispute to submit it to a
referee, but, this act was later found to be impractical. 10 Subsequently,
the Act of March 20, 1810, provided for compulsory arbitration on the
application of one of the litigants. In the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the major step in the area of arbitration was the Act of June 16,
1836.11 This statute supplanted the Acts of 1806 and 1810, and was
designed to provide for a complete system of arbitration.' 2
In order to implement section 27 of article 5 of the Pennyslvania Con-
stitution of 1874,'- the General Assembly passed the Act of April 22,
1874,14 which had the effect of providing arbitration by the trial judge, and
the supplemental Act of May 14, 1874,15 which provided for the arbitration
of civil cases upon agreement of the parties by a referee learned in the law.
The Act of April 25, 1927,16 allows arbitration under contracts which have
a provision for it, and leaves in effect the Acts of 1705, 1836, the two Acts
of 1874, and the common law of arbitration.' 7 The arbitration act which
is the concern of this Comment 18 is an amendment to the Act of 1836, and
represents the last of a long chain of attempts in Pennsylvania to find a
workable system of arbitration.19
7. The writers would like to extend formally the appreciation of the Villanova
Law Review to the Honorable Henry G. Sweeney, President Judge of the Court of
Common Pleas, Delaware County, and the Honorable William F. Dannehower, Judge
of the Court of Common Pleas, Montgomery County, for their invaluable assistance,
and to members of the bars of Delaware County and Montgomery County for their
courtesy and cooperation in completing the questionnaires sent them.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 8 (Supp. 1956).
9. Act of March 21, 1806, P.L. 558.
10. Bellas v. Dewart, 17 Pa. 85 (1806) states that the act was found to be
impractical.
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 1-145 (Supp. 1956).
12. Subsequent to the enactment of the Act of 1836, there was some doubt as to
whether the 1806 statute had been supplanted by the Act of 1836. The question was
settled in 1868 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Steel v. Lineberger, 59 Pa.
308 (1868).
13. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 27.
14. Act of April 22, 1874, P.L. 166.
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 201 (Supp. 1956). PA. R. Civ. P. 1550 suspends this
section in so far as it relates to actions in equity.
16. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 161-179 (Supp. 1956).
17. Meche v. Sheridan, 22 Del. Co. Rep. 56 (1929).
18. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 8-38 (Supp. 1956).
19. There are several other enactments dealing with arbitration in special instances
(e.g. employer-employee disputes) which are not pertinent to this Comment and have
been excluded.
COMMENTS
3
Bartolini and Picciotti: Compulsory Arbitration in Pennsylvania - Its Scope, Effect, Appli
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1957
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
II.
PROCEDURE UNDER THE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION ACT OF 1952.
The act provides that the court of common pleas of any county by
appropriate court rules may decree the submission to arbitration before
a board composed of three members of the bar within the judicial district
of all cases where the amount in controversy does not exceed $1,000,
excepting, however, cases involving title to real estate.20  The arbitrators
are to be appointed by the prothonotary from the list of attorneys qualified
to act, and the names are to be selected from the list in the manner pre-
scribed by the rules of the court, or, absent such rules, in alphabetical
order. 21 In addition, not more than one member of a firm of attorneys may
be appointed to sit on the same board. 22 Upon either the filing of a
praecipe by counsel for either party, and the giving of notice to the oppos-
ing counsel or the filing of an agreement of reference, the arbitrators must
be appointed within ten days, and the board of arbitration must make its
report and render an award within twenty days after the hearing.23
The fees of the arbitrators (which are paid by the county) are deter-
mined by the rules of the court and vary in the several counties from
$15.00 to $35.00 per case for each arbitrator.2 4 Either party is allowed
to appeal from the award to the court of common pleas.2 5 However, a con-
dition of appeal is payment to the county by the appealing party of the
arbitrators' fees which may not be recovered even if the appealing party
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 30 (Supp. 1956).
21. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 31, VII (Supp. 1956). The court rules of both Mont-
gomery County and Delaware County provide specifically for an alphabetical list.
MONT. COUNTY C.P. (Civ.) RULE If(D); DEL. COUNTY C.P. (Civ.) RULE 524(2).
Of course the attorneys cannot be compelled to serve as arbitrators, yet, most attor-
neys are more than willing to have their names included on the list. However, in Del-
aware County, as an added incentive, attorneys who do not wish to have their names
included on the list of arbitrators are also excluded from the masters' list. Interview
with the Honorable Henry G. Sweney, President Judge of the Court of Common
Pleas, Delaware Courty, February 25, 1957.
22. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 31, VII (Supp. 1956); MONT. COUNTY C.P. (CiV.)
RULE II(D); DEL. COUNTY C.P. (Civ.) RULE 524(2).
23. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 31, VIII (Supp. 1956). The rules of Montgomery
County provide that the Arbitration Administrator (an office created specifically to
administer the act in Montgomery County) shall fix a time for hearing, to be held
not less than ten nor more than twenty days after the board has been appointed.
MONT. COUNTY C.P. (Civ.) RULE Ill(A). The Delaware County rules provide that
the Chairman of the Arbitration Board (the first of the arbitrators chosen from the
list) shall fix the day and time of the hearing, again, to be held not less than ten nor
more than twenty days from the time of the selection of the board. DEL. COUNTY C.P.
(Cirv.) RULE 523(3).
24. Swartz, Compulsory Arbitration: An Experiment in Pennsylvania, 42 A.B.A.J.
513, 514. The arbitrator's fee in Montgomery County for his service in each case is
$30.00, excepting where the sole issue to be adjudicated is the assessment of damages,
in which case he receives $10.00. MONT. COUNTY C.P. (CiV.) RULE V(A). In Dela-
ware County the fee is $25.00.
25. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 71 (Supp. 1956) ; MONT. COUNTY C.P. (Civ.) RULE
VI. The Delaware County rules make no specific provision in this regard.
[VOL. 2.
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prevails, but with this limitation: that the fee shall not exceed fifty per cent
of the amount in controversy. 26
The arbitrators are not required to make a record of the hearing, but
any party requesting a record may have it at his own expense.2 7  In addi-
tion, an oath must be taken by the board of arbitrators that they will perform
their duties and decide the case before them justly.2 8
Finally, according to the rules of Montgomery County, the hearings
are to be conducted ". . . with due regard to the law and according to
the rules of evidence, which however shall be liberally construed to promote
justice, and [the arbitrators] shall have the general powers of a court, but
not limited to the following . . . 29 (Emphasis added) The rules then
state that the board shall have the power to subpoena witnesses; issue an
attachment for failure to comply therewith; to compel the production of
books, papers, etc.; to administer oaths or affirmations to witnesses; to de-
termine the admissibility of evidence; to grant continuances; to decide the
law and the facts of the' case before them; and finally that the rules of pro-
cedure shall be those which obtain in the trial of any case before the court
without a jury.3 0
This, in sum, is the system as it is in effect in Montgomery County and
Delaware County. Although the rules from county to county may differ
in particulars, substantially they are as have been set forth.31
III.
PURPOSE, EFFECT AND APPLICATION-ITs ACCEPTANCE BY THE BAR.
Certainly the main purposes of the Act are to offer an effective means
for the quick disposition of small claims, thus reducing the backlog of cases,
and, by means of its appeal provision, to effect a marked limitation of the
numbers of appeals taken. This it has accomplished to a remarkable
degree, as shown by the Honorable William F. Dannenhower's survey.32
26. Ibid. As originally enacted the statute did not contain this 'limitation. It was
added to insure the constitutionality of the act in view of the dictum in Application
of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955), appeal dismissed sub. nora. Smith v.
Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955). See note 48 infra.
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 121 (Supp. 1956); MONT. COUNTY C.P. (Civ.) RULE
III(B). The Delaware Couty rules have no specific provision in this regard.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 44 (Supp. 1956); MONT. COUNTY C.P. (Civ.) Rut.s
III(E). The Delaware County rules have no specific provision in this regard.
29. MONT. COUNTY C.P. (Civ.) RULE III(C). The Delaware County rules have
no specific provision in this regard.
30. In general these provisions are substantially the same as those contained in
the enabling act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 120 (Supp. 1956).
31. An adjunct to compulsory arbitration which has been initiated in both coun-
ties is the pre-trial conference. However, discussion of the pre-trial conference is not
within the scope of this Comment.
32. In an address given to the Judicial Conference in Pittsburgh, January, 1957,
Judge Dannehower sets forth the results of a survey which he conducted among ten
counties to determine the worth of the compulsory arbitration system after its use
for several years. The results of the survey are remarkable. In the ten counties exam-
ined, 3,612 cases were arbitrated since the adoption of compulsory arbitration by those
ten counties, with adoption varying from 1952 in Butler, Erie, and Crawford Counties
COMMENTS
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This survey shows that in Montgomery County, from the inception
of compulsory arbitration in May, 1955, until about January, 1957, 652
cases were arbitrated, 19 of which were appealed, and, of these, 10 were still
pending with no reversals. 3 3 In Delaware County, since April, 1955, 247
cases were arbitrated, 7 appealed, and again none were reversed. 4 Quick
disposition of small claims has also been achieved in a very effective manner.
In Montgomery County before the adoption of compulsory arbitration, the
average time for the disposition of a case listed for trial by jury was from
one and one half to two years. The average time in which a case reached
final adjudication under the compulsory arbitration system was six weeks.35
In Delaware County the problem was not so acute since there the trial
list was current.3 6 While the average time required for a case listed for
trial by jury to reach final disposition was only three months, the average
arbitrated case was disposed of in six weeksY7
From this standpoint then, there can be no question that the experi-
ment with compulsory arbitration has been a success in achieving two
desired results-the prompt disposition of small claims, and the limitation
of appeal.
In general the acceptance of compulsory arbitration by the bar has
been almost unanimous. More specifically the recent survey 2 8 conducted
by the writers shows that of the 130 attorneys of Montgomery and Dela-
ware Counties who completed the questionnaires sent them, only six be-
lieved that the system was not an efficacious means of achieving speedy and
substantial justice. Although the system has shortcomings, which shall
be discussed subsequently, it is the consensus of the members of the bar
that its advantages more than discount its shortcomings. In particular the
chief advantages noted were:
(a) Small claims can now be adjudicated quickly and economically,
without the prohibitive costs and counsel fees entailed in a trial by jury.
(b) The holding of the hearing at a time certain has been of great
benefit to both attorneys and clients, since it eliminates the loss of time
to 1955 in Montgomery and Delaware Counties. Of these 3,612 cases only 147 were
appealed, and only one was reversed. The time lapse from filing of the complaint to
hearing was as little as ten days (Northampton County), and only one report ex-
ceeded three months (Erie County reported after from three to four months). Com-
pulsory Arbitration in Pennsylvania, Address by the Honorable William F. Danne-
hower, Judicial Conference, Pittsburgh, January, 1957, at appendix.
See also Swartz, Compulsory Arbitration: An Experiment in Pennsylvania, 42
A.B.A.J. 513 (1956); Reynolds, Compulsory Arbitration in Montgomery County, 19
SHINGLP 77, 78 (1956).
33. Of these 19, 5 were sustained on appeal, 3 settled, and 1 withdrawn. Com-
Pulsory Arbitration in Pennsylvania, Address by the Honorable William F. Danne-
hower, Judicial Conference, Pittsburgh, January, 1957, at p. 11.
34. Of these 7, 3 have been sustained. Id. at appendix.
35. Id. at appendix.
36. Interview with the Honorable Henry G. Sweney, President Judge of the Court
of Common Pleas, Delaware County, February 25, 1957.
37. See note 34 supra.
38. For a tabular summary of the survey results, see the Appendix.
[VOL. 2.
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previously experienced in awaiting the inception of trial, especially as far
as witnesses are concerned (above all the expert) . 9  Consequently expert
witnesses are more easily obtained.
(c) It does away with the "sympathy verdicts" of juries, since the
awards of the arbitrators are more in accord with the facts and the law.
Cases are decided without regard to whether the defendant is insured or the
plaintiff is a subrogee; and awards are generally satisfactory.4°
(d) It eliminates the time used in selecting a jury, opening and closing
speeches of counsel, and the charge of the court. Almost invariably, the
hearings begin and are concluded within the same day.41
(e) The absence of public attendance 42 greatly decreases the ten-
sion under which witnesses testify in the ordinary jury trial.
(f) When the costs to the county in a jury trial are compared with
those entailed in arbitration there is found to be a great saving.43
The fee of the arbitrators is generally accepted as being adequate.44
However, it must be mentioned that many believed that the fee was ade-
quate only because they regarded sitting as an arbitrator a public service
which the attorney must perform. In addition, many attorneys favored an
increase in the jurisdictional amount, some as high as $5,000.45 All of these
factors indicate the general attitude with which the attorneys of both counties
regard compulsory arbitration. They have given the system their full
cooperation, a major factor in its successful establishment.
IV.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT.
A noteworthy aspect of compulsory arbitration which has caused some
concern, but which has been definitely settled by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, it is constitutionality under the Pennsyslvania Constitution.
In Application of Smith 46 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
39. The average length of time for the duration of hearings in both counties was
1.3 hours, the average maximums 4.6 hours, and the average minimums 1.3 hours.
40. There were one or two opinions to the contrary noted on this point. See note
64 (c) infra.
41. Only seven attorneys reported hearings lasting longer than a single day.
42. The public is not excluded from the hearings, however, since the hearings are
not as attractive to the spectator as trial cases, attendance at them is meagre.
43. Montgomery County and Delaware County report "great savings"; Butler
County: $175.00 per day; Lehigh County: $6,000 per year; Luzerne County and Dau-
phin County: "Savings of 50%; Crawford County: "Substantial savings." Compulsory
Arbitration in Pennsylvania, Address by the Honorable William F. Dannehower, Judi-
cial Conference, Pittsburgh, January, 1957, at appendix.
44. Of the 130 attorneys who completed questionnaires, only 38 felt that the fee
was inadequate.
45. Forty-nine attorneys favored an increase in the jurisdictional amount.
46. 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 625 (1955), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Smith v. Wiss-
ler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955).
COMMENTS
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the provision requiring an appealing party to make payment of the
arbitrators' fees to the county without chance of recovery was not an un-
constitutional deprivation of the right to trial by jury which the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution makes inviolate. 47  However, the court implied that
where a comparatively small claim was involved the provision might
amount to a denial of the right to a trial by jury.48 This engendered the
1955 amendment to the effect that the fee shall not exceed fifty per cent of
the amount in controversy, 49 thus apparently concluding the issue.
The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that
. ..the General Assembly is hereby prohibited from creating
other courts to exercise the powers vested by this Constitution in the
judges of the courts of common pleas and orphan's courts." 5o
Seemingly, from this clause it might be argued that the Compulsory
Arbitration Act is an unconstitutional creation of another court, exercising
the powers vested in the judges of the courts of common pleas, regardless
of the name given the adjudicators. However, this section of the Con-
stitution has been construed literally, and the "powers vested" applies
only to powers vested in the judges of the courts of common pleas, and the
section does not directly vest any powers in the courts of common pleas
which the legislature cannot abolish."t This interpretation is thoroughly
consistent with article 5, section 1 of the Constitution which provides:
"The judicial power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a
Supreme Court, in the courts of common pleas, courts of oyer and
terminer and general jail delivery, courts of quarter sessions of the
peace, orphan's courts, magistrate's courts, and in such other courts
as the General Assembly may from time to time establish."52  (Em-
phasis added.)
Therefore, even if we regard the system as in fact the creation of a new
court by the legislature, it still would not be violative of article 5, section
47. PA. CONST'. art. 1, § 6. "Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right
thereof shall remain inviolate."
48. Application of Smith, 381 Pa. 223, 112 A.2d 630 (1955). The Court further
rebuts the arguments that the act violates article 3, section 7 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution which forbids the passage of special laws; article 5, section 26, providing for
the uniform operation of laws relating to the courts; or that it is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power. Ibid.
49. PA. SAmT. ANN. tit. 5, § 71, V (Supp. 1956). See also note 26, supra. The
rules of Montgomery County go even further and provide: "The Court may, on peti-
tion of any party to a case, on cause shown and to prevent injustice or hardship, re-
duce the amount of this repayment or relieve appellant from such repayment in its
entirety." MONT. COUNTY C.P.. (Civ.) Ruim VI(A) 3.
50. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 26.
51. Gottschall v. Campbell, 234 Pa. 347, 83 Atl. 286 (19i2). For example one
of the powers of a judge of the court of common pleas which the legislature cannot
take away is the power to sit as a judge of oyer and terminer. Id. at 358, 83 Atl. at
290. See also Gerlach v. Moore, 243 Pa. 603, 90 Ati. 400 (1914).
52. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
[VOL. 2.
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26.5 Having survived these attacks on its constitutionality, compulsory
arbitration, armed with this supreme court decision, seems firmly entrenched
in the jurisprudence of Pennsylvania.
V.
PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED
: IN ITS APPLICATION.
As is to be expected in any undertaking of the magnitude and novelty
of compulsory arbitration, problems of a substantive and procedural nature
have arisen since its inception. The first difficulty worthy of note is the
high number of continuances which have been granted. In Montgomery
County, during a period of twenty months (May, 1955 to January, 1957),
930 cases were scheduled for arbitration, of which 276 were continued.
54
The chief reasons given by the attorneys for this high number 55 of con-
tinuances was the difficulty in getting five attorneys together at a time
suitable to all, the ease with which the continuances may be obtained,56 and
the low priority rating given to arbitration cases by the attorneys in respect
to their other cases. Naturally, when a continuance is granted at the last
minute, undue hardship is imposed on all involved, especially the arbitrators,
who have set time aside from their practices as attorneys to serve on the
board. A new time must be set for the hearing; court room arrangements
must be made; and delay, however short, ensues. Certainly we can never
expect to expunge the granting of continuances in compulsory arbitration
cases, for they are a necessary part of legal procedure, and when given
for a valid reason, serve a useful purpose. However, the suggestion
of a few attorneys that they be made more difficult to obtain and a fine im-
posed on counsel seeking one within a certain period (two or three days)
prior to the scheduled hearing, seems reasonable.57
A further difficulty is one which was expected and will no doubt cure
itself with the lapse of time. It arises from the fact that the arbitrators
53. Kilpatrick v. Commonwealth, 31 Pa. 198 (1858). But see Commonwealth
ex rel. Attorney General v. Potts, 79 Pa. 154 (1873) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Hite v.
Swank, 79 Pa. 154 (1872) which held the creation of an additional court of record
in Cambria County unconstitutional because it was not a wholly independent new court.
54. Compulsory Arbitration in Pennsylvania, Address by the Honorable William
F. Dannehower, Judicial Conference, Pittsburgh, January, 1957, at p. 9. However,
Judge Sweney did not feel that the number of continuances granted in Delaware
County was high or that they were too readily granted. Interview with the Honorable
Henry G. Sweeney, President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas, Delaware Coun-
ty, February 25, 1957.
55. Again it must be fairly noted that several attorneys felt that the number of
continuances granted in Montgomery County arbitration proceedings were no greater
proportionally than the number granted in jury trials, and that they were granted for
compelling and necessary legal reasons.
56. See also Compulsory Arbitration in Pennsylvania, Address by the Honorable
William F. Dannehower, Judicial Conference, Pittsburgh, January, 1957, at p. 16.
57. The suggestion of a few attorneys that the parties be made to appear or suf-
fer a default judgment seems too harsh.
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themselves are practicing attorneys, and therefore subconsciously project
themselves into the case. This accounts for the complaints that the
arbitrators attempt "to ferret out evidence" from the witnesses much as
opposing counsel would; that they "tend to try the case and supply what
they feel is a deficiency in the evidence"; that they "tend to an excessive
cross-examination of witnesses which subjects the witnesses to four cross-
examinations; and finally that some arbitrators have an inadvertent prej-
udice against either plaintiffs, or defendants, or insurance companies."' s
These complaints were by no means unanimous, but if not corrected could
pose a threat to the effectiveness of compulsory arbitration. Yet, as has
been stated, it is a drawback which is to be expected in the early stages
of such a system. The total number of arbitrators available in Delaware
and Montgomery Counties is almost four hundred attorneys. When they
are asked to be "part time judges" one cannot expect them to forget imme-
diately and entirely that they are first of all advocates. In time, with
increasing experience, the difficulty should vanish, and with it any com-
plaints of subconscious bias.
A tendency toward too much informality in the hearings is an addi-
tional problem, which, if not corrected, the lapse of time will magnify
rather than cure. Such a tendency is noted only on a few of the ques-
tionnaires, nevertheless, if it became the rule rather than the exception
it could be destructive of the whole system.5 9 The solution to this difficulty
lies with the arbitrators themselves. Though a relaxed and informal
atmosphere to a degree is desirable, court room decorum and formality
which stems from and fosters the high esteem in which our courts are held
and which should accompany the dispensation of justice must be maintained.
Some question has arisen concerning the power of the board of
arbitrators to grant a non-suit. 60 Since the Act of 1952 61 was merely an
amendment to the Act of 1836,62 the sections of the latter act not amended
still apply. Therefore, the section which lists the powers and duties of
arbitrators and referees still controls. It states:
58. In addition twelve attorneys felt that the arbitrators made too minute an ex-
amination of the facts in an attempt to find contribuory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff.
59. The few hearings that the writers have attended have been conducted with
due courtroom decorum though in a relaxed atmosphere-the ideal situation.
60. Several attorneys noted that the board was reluctant to grant a nonsuit since
the statute merely authorizes them to bring in an "award." One attorney noted the
fact that the board refused to grant a nonsuit because it did not think itself empow-
ered to do so. However, whether we regard the decision of the board as an "award"
or a nonsuit their power to grant it to the defendant when the plaintiff has not made
out a cause of action seems clear. The interpretation given in the text is considered
to be correct by the Deputy Prothonotary of Montgomery County and the Court Ad-
ministrator of Delaware County. Letter from the Deputy Prothonotary of Montgom-
ery County to the writers, March 29, 1957; Letter from the Court Administrator of
Delaware County to the writers, March 27, 1957. (Both letters are on file at the
offices of the Villanova Law Review).
61. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 21, 22, 24, 30, 31, 57, 71, 121 (Supp. 1956).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 1-145 (Supp. 1956).
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"Referees and arbitrators in every case . . . shall have power
V. To decide both the law and fact that may be involved in
the cause submitted to them." 63
Since they thus have the power to decide questions of law, the power to
grant a non-suit where plaintiff has not made out a cause of action would
follow. More explicitly, the rules of Montgomery County provide that
the arbitrators " shall have the general powers of a court . . . ," 4
necessarily include the power to grant a non-suit.
A final problem,6 if it may be classified as such, worthy of discussion,
is whether the jurisdiction of the arbitrators should be extended to cases
involving title to real estate. The Act of 1952, expressly excluded claims
involving title to realty from the purview of compulsory arbitration. 8 It is
interesting to note that of the 130 attorneys who completed questionnaires,
49 were in favor of extending the jurisdiction of the board to include claims
involving title to realty. '6 7 The reason assigned almost unanimously was
that attorneys are more capable than juries to determine questions involving
title to real estate, and are more likely to adjudicate the issues objectively.
On the other hand, when we consider the reasons offered by those who were
not in favor of so extending the jurisdiction, the conclusion seems inevitable
that under the present system it is not advisable. First of all many at-
torneys consider litigation of realty claims too technical and specialized a
field where the determination of the issues involved is necessarily a long
and complicated process better suited to a regularly constituted court.
The determination of the jurisdictional amount ($1,000) would almost
involve a trial in itself. Of necessity briefs would have to be submitted,
and because of the serious questions of law involved, written opinions would
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 121 (Supp. 1956).
64. See note 29 supra.
65. Several attorneys mentioned the following as difficulties which they had en-
countered:
(a) Lack of experience on the part of some of the arbitrators. (This is inevitable
in view of the fact that the system is new and that among the some 400 lawyers eli-
gible for appointment variety in degree of experience and ability is certainly to be
expected. Also worthy of note is the fact that all attorneys who sit as arbitrators are
not trial lawyers.)
(b) Attorneys are not ready for trial. (This is not a problem peculiar to com-
pulsory arbitration, and although excessive informality would engender poor prepara-
tion, correction of the former would make poor preparation no more of a problem in
compulsory arbitration than it is in the ordinary trial.)
(c) Lack of knowledge of the rules of evidence on the part of some lawyers and
lack of ability to measure damages. One attorney stated that he was granted an award
on an express, written contract, and that the award was 20% below the contract
price, and he was awarded no interest. (Again, this is lamentable, but it is not a prob-
lem peculiar to the arbitration system. The system is only as good as those who oper-
ate it, and since this difficulty was noted only on three of 130 questionnaires, the
arbitrators must be said to have won the respect of their colleagues as able adminis-
trators of justice.)
66. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 30 (Supp. 1956).
67. Fifty-nine answered in the negative and twenty were without opinion. See
Appendix.
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be highly desirable. The arbitrator, with the limited fee granted him,
cannot be expected to devote the necessary time involved in the adjudica-
tion of the technical questions involved, 68 for he is primarily an attorney
and the time he is able to devote to his duties as an arbitrator is limited.
All the above considerations are in themselves compelling reasons,
but when we reconsider the purposes of compulsory arbitration, we find
no reason for extending the ambit of the act to claims involving title to
realty. The raison d'etre of compulsory arbitration is the quick disposition
of small claims which tend to congest the court calendars. First of all,
most claims involving title to real estate are not small, and secondly, they
are not the type of claims which have produced the tremendous backlog in
our courts.
VI.
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTION.
A final area which remains to be considered is that of overlapping
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the justice of the peace in Montgomery
and Delaware Counties, in civil matters is $500." Thus, in claims where
the amount in controversy is $500 or less, an attorney in Delaware or
Montgomery County has a choice of bringing the claim before a justice
of the peace or submitting to arbitration. However, in fact, the choice is
more apparent than real. In the survey conducted in connection with this
Comment, it was found that of the 130 questionnaires answered, 55 attor-
neys categorically stated in one way or another, that they would choose
arbitration rather than submit cases to justices of the peace who, in the
words of most attorenys of this opinion,7 0 are more often than not relatively
incompetent in the law and nearly always find for the plaintiff. Twenty-
one others stated that they would bring their action before a justice of the
peace if they represented plaintiff, whereas they would choose arbitration
if they represented defendant. Those who categorically selected a justice of
the peace gave as their exclusive reason that it was cheaper and quicker.
Twenty-five others 71 selected arbitration because of limited appeal, and
stated that they would prefer bringing their claims before a justice of the
68. It should be noted that most judges have the assistance of a full-time clerk to
aid him in the research involved.
69. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 241 (Supp. 1956).
70. Attorneys prefer men learned in the law as members of the minor judiciary.
Many of the present members of the minor judiciary are thought to be far from
learned in the law, according to the survey. Some quotations from the questionnaires
received will show this to be true: ". . Justices of the Peace are woefully lacking
in knowledge of the law . . ."; "... most Justices of the Peace favor plaintiff re-
gardless of the facts and law . . ."; a frequent comment was that "J. P." was equal
to Judgment for the Plaintiff; "Justices of the Peace are generally prejudiced and
not learned in the law."; ". . . Arbitrators apply law rather than illusory ideas of
substantial justice." (Reason given for preferring arbitration to a justice of the
peace.)
71. These last figures overlap since, at times, more than one comment appeared
on the same questionnaire.
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peace only if the claims were not to be contested, because where the claim
is contested, appeal from the decision of a justice of the peace is prac-
tically automatic. When we analyze the reasons given by the attorneys for
their choices, the consensus seems to indicate that the sole utility of the
civil jurisdiction of a justice of the peace is in ordinary uncontested collec-
tion claims.
Since justices of the peace have been viewed by the members of the bar
with such antipathy, a secondary legislative purpose in creating the com-
pulsory arbitration system may have been to curtail the effectiveness of the
minor judiciary system by offering an economical mode of adjudication of
small civil claims by men presumed to be more learned in the law.
VII.
CONCLUSION.
In summary, the system of compulsory arbitration has been accorded
whole-hearted acceptance by the members of the legal profession in Penn-
sylvania. Its disadvantages are more than compensated for by its effective
administration, and most of its other disadvantages can be easily corrected.
There seems to be no doubt that since the system enjoys good favor, an in-
crease in the jurisdictional amount will soon be forthcoming. 72 However,
in attempting to broaden the scope of the system because it has been a
success, one must not lose sight of the original purpose of the system.
Compulsory arbitration is not a panacea. Its original purpose was the
quick adjudication of small claims. To increase the jurisdictional limit to
a very large sum 73 or to include claims involving title to real estate, would
be an admission by the legislature of our need for another court or for
more judges in our courts of common pleas. The better solution in that
case would be to create another court or increase the number of judges in
the courts of common pleas rather than create permanent extra-judicial
boards to carry on jtidicial functions.
If it is a secondary legislative purpose of compulsory arbitration in-
directly to curtail the frequency of resort to the minor judiciary in civil
cases because of its apparently less than happy reputation among lawyers,
then this purpose would be better accomplished by a long-awaited reform
of the minor judiciary system in Pennsylvania by a constitutional amend-
ment.
74
72. A bill to increase the jurisdictional amount was introduced in February of
this year. PA. H.R. 293, Sess. of 1957.
73. An increase in its jurisdictional amount to $1500 or $2000 would be in keeping
with the avowed purpose of compulsory arbitration since in these days of heavy traffic
a large number of negligence cases in excess of $1000 is usual.
74. If compulsory arbitration is to become a permanent part of the judicial sys-
tem in Penfisylvania, it should be put on a more stable basis, that is, permanent arbi-
tration boards, and a complete abolition of the civil jurisdiction of the minor judici-
ary, as now constituted, should be effected. But if this happens, will not the General
Assembly in effect have created another court?
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All in all, the experiment with compulsory arbitration in Pennsylvania
may be counted a success. Only time can disclose the value of a matured
system which is now only developing, but if it stays within the bounds
indicated it will be an invaluable aid to the effective administration of justice
in Pennsylvania.
Anthony L. Bartolini
Anthony L. V. Picciotti
1. Average Number of Times before
Arbitration Board:
(a) Arbitrator
(b) Plaintiff's Attorney
(c) Defendant's Attorney
(d) Insurance Company's Attorney
2. Average Length of Hearings
(in hours) :
(a) Maximum
(b) Minimum
(c) Average
3. Fee of Arbitrators
Adequate Compensation:
(a) Yes
(b) No
4. Favor Increase in
Jurisdictional Amount:
(a) Yes
(b) No
5. Proceedings Tend to Favor:
(a) Plaintiffs
(b) Defendants
(c) Neither
6. Payment of Arbitration Fee
as Condition of Appeal:
(a) Favored
(b) Disapproved
7. Insurance Company Settlements:
(a) Helped
(b) Hindered
(c) No Effect
8. Provision Allowing Liberal Construc-
tion of Rules of Evidence:
(a) Aided
(b) Not aided
(c) No effect
9. Extension of Jurisdiction
to Realty Claims:
(a) Yes
(b) No
10. Use Justice of Peace or
Arbitration Board Where
Their Jurisdictions Overlap:
(a) Justice of Peace
(b) Arbitration
APPENDIX
Montgomery Delaware
County County
(Delaware has
no such provision)
Average
6.5
4.2
3.6
2.4
4.6
1.3
1.3
Total
89
38
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TORTS-PERSONAL INJURY-PROOF OF CAUSATION OF HERNIATED
INTERVERTEBRAL DISC.
Perhaps in no other field of law must the trial lawyer digress as far
from his own realm and transgress so deeply, a neophyte, into the pulsating
and somewhat frightening field of medicine, as when he comes face to face
with a personal injury case. The problem becomes more complex, when
he must attempt to prove the causation of the "slipped" intervertebral disc,
which was unknown to the physician himself until comparatively recent
years. In proving his case, the lawyer must have a comprehensive under-
standing of the spinal column, and of the disc as a medical entity. For his
client's welfare the attorney must put himself into the shoes of the physician,
and analyze the medical approach to the problem to be better able to
understand the legal implications involved. It is not within the scope of this
Comment to attempt a solution to the myriad problems concerning the proof
of the causation of the "slipped" disc, but, rather, to stimulate apprehension
of the problems, so that the legal practitioner, in conjunction with the
physician, may present his case in the best possible light.
I.
THE SPINAL COLUMN.
In order to discuss adequately the causation of a disc injury, the
attorney must have a working knowledge of the entity of which the disc
is an integral part, namely, the spinal column. The following is considered
to be an accurate general account of the anatomy and physiology of the.
spine.1
The spinal column consists of thirty-three vertebrae, soft tissue known
as intervertebral discs, and ligaments which serve to hold the spinal column
together. The spine extends from the base of the skull, continues down the
back, to a point midway through the pelvic area. There are two main
divisions in the column: the true, or movable vertebrae, and the false, or
immovable vertebrae.
The true vertebrae division is further divided into three areas, namely,
the cervical, the thoracic, and the lumbar. The upper section is the
cervical or neck area, consisting of seven vertebrae. The second area, the
thorax or middle back, consists of twelve vertebrae to which the ribs are
attached. The third section of the true vertebrae, the lumbar or lower
back, consisting of fourteen vertebrae, is where eighty-five to ninety-five
per cent of disc injuries occur.2
1. See COLONNA, REGIONAL ORTHOPEDIC SURGERY 122 (1950); Lecture by Tuby
and Bernstein, Philadelphia Legal-Medical Institute, Oct. 12, 1956.
2. Wiltberger, The Medicolegal Aspects of Low Back Pain, 389 INS. L.J. 410(1956).
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The false or immovable vertebrae consists of the sacrum, a triangular
bone upon which the lumbar rests, and the coccyx, or more commonly,
the tail, which has no movement.
The spinal column is formed somewhat like the letter "S." The cervix
has a lordatic, or forward curve; the thorax, a kyphotic, or backward curve;
and the lumbar, again a forward curve. Awareness of these curves is
most important, for loss of either is one of the elements which may be
shown to prove a disc injury.8
II.
THE INTERVERTEBRAL Disc.
Quite often, in reference to the injury under consideration, the term
"slipped" disc is used rather than the technically correct term of "herniated"
disc. As a matter of fact, the disc does not slip, but ruptures and the inner
substance of the disc, called the nucleus pulposus, infringes upon and exerts
pressure on the nerves emerging from the spinal cord. Use of this
misnomer, while not extremely important, does cause unnecessary confusion
and misapprehension on the part of laymen and lawyers alike. In one
case the herniation was referred to as a fracture,4 which is completely
fallacious and ambiguous.
In presenting a herniated disc case one should be certain to have a
precise knowledge of medical terminology. A brief definition of the disc
and its function would serve a useful purpose. The disc is an oval washer
type structure consisting of the annulus fibriosus, or hard outer covering,
and the nucleus pulposus, or gelatinous material which has a spongy
consistency, so that when compressed it has a springlike movement.5 In
short, the disc might be termed the "shock absorber" whose purpose is to
ward off severe jarring which might possibly injure the vertebrae. An
apt analogy has been drawn between the herniation of an intervertebral
disc and the blowout of an automobile tire.0 When there is sudden and
extreme force exerted on a portion of the disc, there may be a break in
the hard outer case, or annulus fibriosus, thereby allowing the nucleus
pulposus to flow through and infringe upon the nerves. There it solidifies,
causing pain and possible impairment of the functions of the extremities.
It must be remembered that to be a true herniated disc, the nucleus pulposus
must flow through the rupture at a place where it can irritate nerve roots.7
3. 1 CURRENT MEDICINE FOR ATTORNEYS 25 (1953).
4. Kabinski v. George Weston Ltd., 306 N.Y. 432, 99 N.E.2d 217 (1951).
5. MEDICOLEGAL ASPECTS OF HEAD, NEcK AND BACK INJURIES 165 (Stumpf and
Horwitz ed. 1955).
6. 1 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 88 (1954).
7. Smith, The Intervertebral Disc in Forensic Medicine, 24 INDUSTRIAL MEDICINE
& SURGERY 36 (1955).
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III.
ELEMENTS OF PROOF.
Because of the comparatively recent recognition of the herniated in-
tervertebral disc by medical men,s it has been the popular opinion of many
lawyers that it is nearly impossible to prove whether there has or has not
been a herniation of the disc. In truth, the converse of this is correct, for,
while the only positive method of determining the presence of a ruptured
and herniated disc is by operation,9 there are certain objective signs of a
herniation.
The legal practitioner, through a physician, should make absolutely
certain that the following symptoms are thoroughly tested for: history of
acute "abnormal motion," 10 spasm of the muscles in the back which cannot
be feigned, 1 loss of the lordatic curve, 12 pain radiating down the back of
the leg, 18 and loss of the Achilles tendon reflex.'
4
Three other vital tests should be made in order to insure adequate pre-
trial investigation of the existence of the herniation. The first of these is
the Lasque Test.15  In this test the muscles of the back are stretched by
placing the patient on his back, bending his leg and suddenly, and while
the hip is in flexion, moving the leg back down again. The second test is
called the Faber Test,16 wherein the physician takes and places the heel
of one leg of the patient, who is lying on his back, on the knee of the
patient's other leg, and then pushes the knee to the table, thus rocking the
pelvis and causing excruciating pain if a herniation is present. The third,
and most widely used test is the McBride Disability Evaluation Test, 17
the popular name of which "toe to mouth," explains its operation.
If time has been taken, and an effort made to see that the basic
symptoms have been tested for, and one of the aforementioned vital tests
performed, the chances of obtaining a favorable verdict will be greatly
enhanced, provided the symptoms are present and the tests positive. Like-
wise, the defendant's attorney would do well to bring out on cross-
examination the fact that the vital tests were not performed, or that some
of the basic symptoms have not been tested for, or the tests were negative.
8. Young, Additional Lessons Stimulating Protruded Intervertebral Disc, 17 J
INT. COLLEGE OF SURGEONS 831 (1952); 1 CURRENT MEDICINE FOR ATTORNEYS 26
(1953).
9. Smith, supra note 7.
10. Khedraoo and Scuderi, Herniation of the Intervertebral Disc, 23 J. INT. COL-
LEGE OF SURGEONS 194 (1955).
11. Ibid.
12. 1 CURRENT MEDICINE FOR ATTORNEYS 26 (1953).
13. Denker and Kennedy, Medico-Legal Aspects of Spinal Cord Injuries, 11
Mo. L. REv. 111 (1946).
14. 1 CURRENT MEDICINE FOR ATTORNEYS 26 (1953).
15. WILEs, ESSENTIALS OF ORTHOPEDICS 36 (1949).
16. Lecture by Tuby and Bernstein, Philadelphia Legal-Medical Institute, Oct.
12, 1956.
17. Ibid.
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IV.
THE XRAY.
The Xray should be briefly mentioned because of its prominent use
in the field of medicine for determining internal injuries. But it is men-
tioned only to quickly dispel any belief of its value in determining the
existence of a disc herniation. Because of the nature of the substance of the
disc, it will not show up on an ordinary Xray. The sole use of the Xray
would be to detect a narrowing of the interspace between the vertebrae
which may lead to a suspicion of an abnormal disc.' 8 An abnormal disc
may only be suspected because the thickness of a normal disc can vary
with those immediately above or below any given vertebrae. Also, the
thickness of a disc can vary from the time of arising to the time of retiring;
therefore, the importance of a narrowed interspace in diagnosis may be
insignificant.' 9
However, the use of the Xray is not entirely without value. When
combined with a pontopaque, that is a contrast media of iodized oil or air
injected into the spine, evidence that a herniation extends to the spinal
canal may be shown by means of an Xray.20 This is known as a myelogram,
and is generally accepted as the most objective of all the tests employed'to
delineate herniations of the intervertebral discs. 2' But the use of the
myelogram has not escaped criticism by prominent neurologists and
orthopedic surgeons.2 2  This so-called positive Xray is performed by in-
jecting dye (the pontopaque) into the space between the second and third
lumbar vertebrae. The solution then moves by gravitation, and positive
Xrays are taken. If a herniation is present, there should be a defect in
the pontopaque at that point. It should be pointed out that this procedure
is far from perfect, in that there may be defects in the column where there
is in fact no herniation, thus giving birth to the term "False Positive"
myelogram.23 Medical authorities are virtually in unanimous agreement
that the myelogram should not be resorted to unless an operation is definitely
otherwise indicated, mainly because of the difficulty in removing the
pontopaque solution.2 4 The courts have generally been aware of the
harm which may result from the myelogram and have not required the
18. Smith, supra note 7.
19. Ibid.
20. Donaldson, Medical Facts That Can And Cannot Be Proved By X-Ray, 41
MICH. L. Rzv. 875 (1943).
21. Epstein and Davidoff, Iodized Oil Mylography of the Cervical Spine, 52 AM.
J. ROENTGENOGRAPHY 253 (1944).
22. French and Trowbridge, The False Positive Lumbar Myelogram, 4 NEUROL-
ocY 339 (1954) ; Smith, The Intervertebral Disc in Forensic Medicine, 24 INDUSTRIAL
MEDICINE AND SURGERY 36 (1955).
23. French and Trowbridge, The False Positive Lumbar Myelograin, 4 NEUROL-
oGy 339 (1954).
24. Lecture by Tuby and Bernstein, Philadelphia Legal-Medical Institute, Oct.
12. 1956.
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injured party to submit to its use.2 5 Difficulty in removing the dye (usually
this can be done only by operation) is the cause of concern, since the
potential for infection is increased by its retention.
V.
WHIPLASH INJURY.
When a herniation of an intervertebral disc occurs in the cervical area
of the spine, generally it is the result of the so-called "whiplash" injury.
-Briefly, this injury can be described as occuring when an automobile pas-
senger snaps his neck in a series of rapid, more or less violent, oscillations
usually due to a rear-end collision. 26 The person with a long thin neck is
especially apt to sustain substantial disability.2 7 Because of his unsuspect-
ing, relaxed condition at the time of the collision, the victim is prone to
develop a disturbing emotional reaction.28  The attorney should be careful
to consider this factor when calculating his, damage claim.
Coincident with the factor of the relaxed condition of the injured
party, and his oftentimes complete unawareness of the impending collision,
is the fact that the victim is seldom incapacitated immediately after the
accident. It is usually several hours later or even the next day that the
symptoms appear: neck pain, stiffness, and back pain.2 9 It should be noted
that the extent of property damage to the automobile is practically irrelevant
when considering whether or not to bring suit because tests have shown
that there is more likelihood of a disc injury occurring when the offending
automobile was being driven at ten miles per hour than at twenty miles
per hour. 30
VI.
THE ATTORNEY'S PROBLEM AT THE TRIAL STAGE.
The attorney's task of convincing the trier of fact that his client has
suffered a bona fide disc injury is indeed difficult. The way is a tedious one,
and it must be remembered that the symptoms of a herniated intervertebral
disc may come and go. For his reason, the same individual may be
examined by two equally competent physicians on two distinct occasions
25. Sultan & Chera Corp. v. Fallas, 59 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1952); Crawford Paint
Works v. Pascatore, 72 R.I. 471, 53 A.2d 452 (1947).
26. Abbott and Gray, Common Whiplash Injuries to the Neck, 152 A.M.A.J. 1698
(1953).
27. Shenkin, Motorized Intermittent Traction for Treatment of Herniated Cervi-
cal Disc, 156 A.M.A.J. 1067 (1954).
28. Abbott and Gray, supra note 26.
29. Ibid.
30. Severy, Mathewson, and Bechtol, Controlled Automobile Rear-end Collisions,
an Investigation of Related Engineering and Medical Phenomena, CANADIAN SERV-
Iczs MeD. J. 727, 759 (1955).
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with varying results in diagnosis-a fact which is difficult for attorneys and
jurors to understand.31
The problem is further compounded by the nature of the injury. Not
only may the classic symptoms come and go, but also there is often a
delayed reaction, and it may be from six months to a year after the accident
before such symptoms arise.82
The problem is less one of law than of trial technique. The attorney
should leave no stone unturned. Because of sharp critical cross-examina-
tion, he must require complete examination of his client by his physician
witness before he takes the witness stand. The medical expert must be
prepared to testify concerning the use of the tests previously mentioned.
Of course the physician is not required to establish the fact beyond a reason-
able doubt, nonetheless, he must explain why he believes his conclusions
correct.- The trial lawyer should beware of a superficial approach by the
physician for otherwise it is usual that the physician will not give the matter
more than superficial attention either in preparation or while being examined
on the witness stand. 4
Even in the field of workmen's compensation, where a favorable attitude
towards the employee permeates the whole proceeding, the courts will
ordinarily not allow recovery when the claimant testifies that while doing
his normal work he "got a pretty sharp pain in the small of [his] back"
and was not able to straighten up.85 It seems that a majority of courts re-
quire a showing that the injury was due to an "accident" (as the term is
defined in the statute) arising out of the course of employment, and will
find no "accident" unless the injury occurred while the injured person was
performing his usual work in the usual manner.8 6 However, in the case of
Purity Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Conm'n,7 recovery was allowed even
though the disability was caused by ordinary exertion without unusually
heavy labor. The court found that the usual exertion of the employee was
a causative factor in bringing on the ultimate disabling condition. It is
submitted that the latter rule is the better since causation is the real problem
involved in these cases, and if usual exertion is found to be a causative
factor there seems to be no reason to deny recovery, even though an
"accident" cannot be shown. As an aid in establishing causation, medical
31. Wiltberger, Medicolegal Aspects of the Low Back Pain, 389 INs. L.J. 410
(1956).
32. McNeal, "Whiplash"--Defense Counsel's View, 6 Ciev.-MAR. L. Rgv. 38
(1957).
33. Gray, Requisites and Importance of Sound Medical Examination in Medica-
Legal Cases, 18 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 173 (1946).
34. Curphey, The Medical Preparation of a Medico-Legal Case: The Physician's
Viewpoint, 154 A.M.A.J. 487 (1954).
35. Landis v. General Motors Corp., 180 Pa. Super. 332, 119 A.2d 645 (1956).
36. McNeill v. Thompson, 53 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1951) ; Schaefer v. Central News
Co., 179 Pa. Super. 559, 118 A.2d 268 (1955); Apker v. Crown Can Co., 150 Pa.
Super. 402, 28 A.2d 551 (1942).
37. 115 Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949).
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treatment should be procured so soon as possible after the injury. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court emphasized this in allowing a claim for injury
occurring in unusual circumstances saying:
"The present claim does not rest solely on an employee's testimony
of experiencing sharp pain followed sometime later by a disability
which might be attributed to a condition not traumatic in origin, but
due to a long standing infection. Here, pain was promptly diagnosed
by a skilled orthopedic surgeon as a ruptured disc resulting from that
strain and an operation a few days later demonstrated the correctness of
the diagnosis and restored the patient to a sound condition of the body;
thus proving the causal connection between the accident and the
disability." 38
As the court indicates above, early medical treatment will facilitate the
establishment of causation.
Cognizance should also be taken of the fact that an operation will not
always lead to a complete cure of the herniation. Even after a rather
successful lamenectomy (disc removal), it is frequently necessary for the
injured party to pursue a new and less laborious occupation. One reason
advanced for this is that, in spite of a successful operation, there usually
will be some residual disability. 9
Recently the courts have held that an injured party is not required to
submit to a disc operation, usually on the ground that such an operation is
uncertain as to ultimate beneficial result, is in some degree dangerous to
life and limb, and might involve extraordinary suffering.40
There have been cases allowing recovery on the specific ground of
"wear and tear", rather than requiring a specific trauma.41 This possibility
should not be overlooked where the particular employment is of a nature
which could cause an increase in the normal degeneration of the body.
VII.
DAMAGES.
The signs and symptoms of an intervertebral disc herniation may
come and go, the client being disabled for various periods and then return-
ing to full capacity between such periods.4 2  For this reason a monetary
evaluation of disability is, to say the least, difficult. The following ex-
amples, while not solving the difficulty, demonstrate the possibilities for
38. Gavula v. Sims Co., 155 Pa. Super. 206, 38 A.2d 482, 485 .(1944).
39. See note 31 supra.
40. Sultan and Chera Corp. v. Fallas, 59 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1952); U.S. Coal and
Coke Co. v. Lloyd, 305 Ky. 105, 203 S.W.2d 47 (1947); Maneini v. Superior Ct., 78
R.I. 373, 82 A.2d 390 (1956).
41. Stokes v. Miller, 50 So.2d 509 (La. 1951); Caddy v. Maturi & Co., 217 Minn.
207, 14 N.W.2d 393 (1944).
42. 11 CURRENT MEDICINE vOR ATTORNEYS 2 (1955).
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total recovery. Probably one of the largest awards given for this type of
injury was to a seaman injured when a catwalk gave way from under his
feet, causing herniation of two lumbar discs. After undergoing a fusion
of the lower spine he was awarded the sum of $149,788.4 Other illustrative
figures are: $50,000,44 $30,000,45 $25,000,46 down to a low of $5,000.41
Since juries do not give a schedule of apportionment to elements of damage,
these figures can be misleading.
The Marquette Medical Review has reported the use of a new acrylic
plastic which can be moulded into the space between the vertebrae, from
which the disc has been removed by surgery.48 It appears that this device
markedly reduces overall disability. The possibility of using the device
should be explored by the defendant's attorney as a means of reducing the
amount of damages.
VIII.
THE MEDICAL EXPERT.
Possibly, the greatest difficulty at trial with which the attorney must
contend is the medical expert.49 Both parties call their own experts, and
more often than not, they give testimony which is contradictory in every
respect and often of no help to the trier of fact. In truth, the attorney
himself may be completely surprised at the testimony of his own expert.
The lawyer and the physician should meet in person and study with care
the information currently available.," In this way confusion will be avoided
and perhaps the case won.
Expert medical testimony is admissible to show. causation.51 However,
oftentimes, rather than being educated on the medical aspects of the case,
the trier of fact is confused, much less enlightened, by the testimony of the
expert witness. Doubtless, the technical nature of the testimony contributes
to this confusion. Another factor adding largely to the confusion is the
fact that since each litigant procures his own expert, and the expert, con-
sciously or subconsciously, is anxious to please his "employer", he frequently
gives biased testimony. The medical expert has become a persuader rather
than an informant. 52 Too often the worth of the expert's testimony depends
43. Jackson v. Sabine Transportation Co., (Texas County Ct. 1954) as cited
in 15 NACCA L.J. 424 (1955).
44. Kaup v. Crawford Trucking Co., 283 App. Div. 838, 128 N.Y.S.2d 699 (3d
Dep't 1954).
45. Sandifeor v. Thompson, 280 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1955).
46. Knoehe v. Meyers Sanitary Co., 177 Kan. 423, 280 P.2d 605 (1955).
47. Berg v. Ullievic, 244 Minn. 390, 70 N.W.2d 133 (1955).
48. 20 MARQ. MED. REv. 62 (1955); 11 CURRENT MEDICIN, FOR ATTORNEYS 2
(1955).
49. 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1692 (3d ed. 1940).
50. Curphey, The Medical Preparation of Medico-Legal Cases: the Physician's
Viewpoint, 154 A.M.A.J. 487 (1954).
51. Langenfelder v. Thompson, 179 Mo. 502, 20 A.2d 491 (1941).
52. 1 BELLI, MODERN TRIALS § 82 n.ll (1954).
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not on what he says, but on how he says it. The remedy for this situation
seems to be found in the plan of providing impartial, independent medical
experts, as is done by the Supreme Court of New York.5 s The experts are
chosen by the court from a panel selected by the New York Academy of
Medicine and the New York County Medical Society. While it is not
within the scope of this Comment to enter into a detailed discussion of this
plan, it must be mentioned that it has met with remarkable success during its
short existence (2 years).
Ix.
'CONCLUSION.
While the problem of proving to the trier of fact any personal injury
and, in particular, a herniation of an intervertebral disc is Herculean, it is
not impossible. The problem stems from an even greater one, that is,
lack of a basic understanding between the medical and legal professions.
There should be greater emphasis placed on medico-legal problems in
both medical schools and law schools. The intervertebral disc herniation
is but one facet of a many-sided prism, where cooperation between the
professions is needed. As is succinctly stated in the concluding section of
the Interprofessional Code of the Wisconsin State Medical Society and Bar
Association:
"It is an obligation which each profession owes to the other in
the best interest of the public as well as in the best interest of the
separate reputations of the two professions, and that while law and
medicine may each be termed a science, each is an inexact science; and
such inexactness is and always will be accented by the human limita-
tions of its practitioners." 14
Without this cooperation, no medico-legal case will ever be completely
fruitful.
John F. Gaffney
TORTS-REs IPSA LOQUITUR-THE PROBLEM OF PROOF
IN THE EXPLODING BOTTLE SITUATION.
Established tradition within a jurisdiction has ever militated against
the application of novel doctrines. Their ultimate application is fre-
quently prompted by the recognition of an important need. The resolute-
ness of adherence to their tenets is often tempered as if in deference to a
once undoubted authority. Within many American jurisdictions there
53. Peck, A Successful New Plan: Impartial Medical Testimony, 42 A.B.A.J.
931 (1956).
54. Medicine and the Law: Mutual Understanding Between Physicians and At-
torneys, 160 A.M.A.J. 1415 (1956).
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is evidence that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is usurping the power of
the traditional methods of proof of negligence in cases of injury arising
from exploding bottles. This Comment has as its purpose a review of this
phase of the doctrine; documenting the difficulties which it initially en-
countered, and the changes in the doctrine resulting from this encounter.
I.
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE.
The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to cases involving
injuries through exploding bottles is at most an exception to one of the
essentials of the doctrine or at least an extension of the doctrine as to this
particular. Illustrative of the nature and limitations of the doctrine is the
case of Cohn v. United Airlines Transport Corp.,' wherein it is pointed
out that the following must be shown in order to invoke the rule:
1. The injuring instrumentality must have been in the management
or control of the defendant or his servants.
2. 'he accident must have been such that ordinarily it would not have
occurred if those in control had exercised due care.
3. The inference of the defendant's negligence is reasonable under
the circumstances.
A further element, often proffered as the sole reason for the application of
the doctrine, is that the circumstances surrounding the accident are pecu-
liarly within the knowledge of the defendant. 2 This last requisite partakes
of the prior element of control, but it further recognizes an evidentiary
advantage enjoyed by the defendant.
Control, as a necessary factor, has confronted litigants in exploding
bottle suits with their most difficult problem. This control is physical in
its nature under the classic interpretation of the doctrine.3 In addition it
has been held that the control or management of the instrumentality caus-
ing the injury must be exclusive. 4 When it is realized that the significance
of the doctrine is one of probabilities, the reason for the emphasis placed
upon this element becomes quite apparent.5 Under the doctrine it is in-
1. 17 F.Supp. 865 (D.C. Wyo. 1937).
2. Auzene v. Gulf Public Service Co., 181. So. 54 (La. App. 1938) ; Joly v. Jones,
115 Vt. 174, 55 A.2d 181 (1947).
3. Sanders v. Nehi Bottling Co., 30 F.Supp. 332 (N.D. Tex. 1939); Gerber v.
Faber, 54 Cal. App. 674, 129 P.2d 485 (1942) ; Stodder v. Coca Cola Bottling Plants,
142 Me. 139, 48 A.2d 622 (1946) Winifree v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 19 Tenn.
App. 144, 83 S.W.2d 903 (1935); Alagood v. Texas Bottling Co., 135 S.W.2d 1056(Tex. Civ. App. 1940); 17 ALBANY L. REv. 200 (1953); 27 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 159(1952).
4. Sanders v. Nehi Bottling Co., 30 F.Supp. 332 (N.D. Tex. 1939) ; Gerber v.
Faber, 54 Cal. App. 674, 129 P.2d 485 (1942) ; Naumann v. Wekle Brewing Co.,
127 Conn. 44, 15 A.2d 180 (1940) ; Stodder v. Coca Cola Bottling Plants, 142 Me.
139, 48 A.2d 622 (1946) ; 27 ST. JOHN's L. Rgv. 159 (1952).
. 5. Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952).
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ferred from the happening of the event and the surrounding circumstances
that defendant's negligence more probably than any other agency has
been the proximately causative factor in the plaintiff's injury.6 With the
presence of exclusive physical control, this probability is increased. In its
absence, the probability that some other cause has intervened is increased,
and to that extent the probability of causation on the part of the defendant
decreases.
Ordinarily control on the part of a defendant-bottler is lacking when
the consumer or the retailer is injured by the explosion of a bottle. Both
possession and control terminate upon delivery of the commodity to the
retailer. 7 It became necessary therefore to change this element of res ipsa
loquitur if the doctrine was to be applied to such instances. This was
accomplished in Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola Bottling Co.," which has since
been regarded as a leading case in the field. There the court recognized
that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the injuring act must bespeak
the negligence of the defendant, and that, prima facie, want of due care
should be referred to the one under whose control the instrumentality was
found. Admitting, however, that inferential negligence should be imputed
to those intervening after the defendant bottler has lost possession, this
inference is rebutted when it affirmatively appears that the intervenor
(usually the retailer) neither handled the bottle improperly, nor did any-
thing to change its condition from that in which it was received. The
inference of negligence remains, however, and is ultimately cast back upon
the defendant by a systematic process of elimination. Previously the court
had satisfied the other requirements of the doctrine, reasoning that
bottles filled with a harmless beverage do not ordinarily explode, and when
they do, an inference of negligence may arise.
Control as an essential element has since been channeled so that the
rule as it exists today states that where the defendant had control of the
instrumentality at the time of the allegedly negligent act, though not at
the time of the injury, this will suffice, always provided, however, that the
plaintiff disproves any intervening negligence and that the instrumentality
had not been changed since it left the defendant's possession. 9 Unlike
contributory negligence which at times must be shown affirmatively by
the defendant, the burden of eliminating intervening causation is always
cast upon the plaintiff. 10
6. Stewart v. Crystal Coca Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ariz. 60, 68 P.2d 953 (1937);
Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952).
7. Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952).
8. 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E. 1087 (1912).
9. Hoffing v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948);
Cole v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 65 Ga. App. 204, 15 S.E.2d 543 (1941) ; Macon Coca
Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga. App. 573, 190 S.E. 879 (1937); Payne v. Rome
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E. 1087 (1912) ; Bradley v. Conway
Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282, 118 P.2d 601 (1941) ; Kees v. Canada Dry Ginger
Ale, 289 Mo. App. 1080, 199 S.W.2d 76 (1947) ; Stalle v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 Mo.'
520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925); Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183
S.W.2d 968 (1944).
10. Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952) ; Auzene
v. Gulf Public Service Co., 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1938) ; Sater v. Griesedieck Western
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Courts, in electing whether or not to apply res ipsa loquitur often point
out that the greater weight of American authority favors applying the
doctrine to cases involving exploding bottles."
In some jurisdictions the application of the doctrine gives rise to a
presumption of negligence.12  In others it only permits an inference
of fact.13 In either case, it may be rebutted by defendant's showing that
he discharged the duty of care imposed upon him.
14
II.
INTERVENING CAUSATION.
Assuming the availability of res ipsa loquitur to a plaintiff injured by
an exploding bottle, he must initially, in order to enjoy its benefits, dis-
prove intervening causation.' 5 If, despite his efforts, it remains equally
probable that the injury could have come about by means other than the
negligence of the defendant, the doctrine is inapplicable.",
Some jurisdictions have been more lenient than others with regard
to the discharge of this burden. The standards vary from requiring a
disproving of their causative relation to a degree of reasonable certainty,
17
to those which hold it sufficient if the evidence permits a reasonable in-
ference that the instrumentality was not accessible to extraneous forces
and was carefully handled by the plaintiff and any third person.' 8 The
general rule states that the plaintiff has discharged his burden if he has
disproven intervening causation by a preponderance of the evidence, 19
circumstantial or otherwise .2  The effect of plaintiff's successfully dis-
Brewery Co., 200 Okla. 302, 193 P.2d 575 (1948) ; Boykin v. Chase Bottling Works,
32 Tenn. App. 518, 222 S.W.2d 889 (1949) ; Benkendorfer v. Garrett, 143 S.W.2d
1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
11. Boykin v. Chase Bottling Works, 32 Tenn. App. 518, 222 S.W.2d 889 (1949);
Benkendorfer v. Garrett, 143 S.W.2d 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) ; 4 LA. L. REv. 606
(1942).
12. Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga. 573, 190 S.E. 879 (1937);
6 FORDHAM L. REv. 483.
13. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) ; Cole
v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 65 Ga. App. 204, 15 S.E.2d 543 (1941); Payne v. Rome
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E. 1087 (1912) ; 17 ALBANY L. REv. 200
(1953) ; 4 SYRACUSt L. REv. 148 (1952).
14. Vargas v. Blue Seal Bottling Works, 12 La. App. 652, 126 So. 707 (1930).
15. Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal. 2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952) ; Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) ; Hoffing v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App.2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948) ; Canada Dry Ginger Ale Co.
v. Jochum, 43 A.2d 42 (D.C. 1945) ; Meyers v. Alexandria Coca Cola Bottling Co., 8
So.2d 737, (La. App. 1943) ; Kees v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, 239 Mo. App. 1080,
199 S.W.2d 76 (1947) ; 42 MICH. L. Rev. 536 (1943).
16. Stewart v. Crystal Coca Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ariz. 60, 68 P.2d 952 (1937)
Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952) ; Boykin v. Chase
Bottling Works, 32 Tenn. App. 518, 222 S.W.2d 889 (1949).
17. Auzene v. Gulf Public Service Co., 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1938).
18. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) ; Pat-
tinsori v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 333 Mich. 253, 52 N.W.2d 688 (1952); Honea v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968 (1944).
19. Benkendorfer v. Garrett, 143 S.W.2d 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
20. Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952) ; Escola
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charging this burden has been described in capsule form as a process
whereby the plaintiff proves the defendant's negligence by disproving
that of others.21
Conflicts arise in the application of these rules to both intervening
negligence and unavoidable accident. It is generally agreed that every
remote possibility need not be considered by the plaintiff. 22  However,
what constitutes a remote possibility has led to some disagreement. This is
particularly manifest when the bottle has been channeled through a
supermarket. In such instances an almost insurmountable barrier has
been placed before the plaintiff, the courts often dismissing his efforts with
the curt observation that the bottle could have been injured or shaken while
in the supermarket.23  To add to the difficulty, the testimony of the manager
as to the condition of the bottle while in his place of business has been
held inadmissible as mere conjecture and speculation. 24 Of some im-
portance in the supermarket cases is the duration of the bottle's stay in the
store, as this reflects on the probability of its being rendered defective.
Though of somewhat similar characteristics, the courts have been less
demanding with regard to self-service bottle dispensers.25
Furthermore, in view of the low elasticity of glass, the plaintiff, in his
proof must consider any unusual temperature changes to which the bottle
might have been subjected. 26 An explosion of a bottle upon being exposed
to ordinary and anticipated refrigeration is not evidence of intervening
causation or contributory negligence, 27 but points more readily to a defect
in the glass or to excessive carbonation.
28
Illustrative of this conflict are cases wherein it is held not to amount to
contributory negligence for the plaintiff to have emptied a warm case of
Coca-Cola into ice,29 and others which hold the doctrine of res ipsa in-
applicable due to the probability that bottles in a cooler were injured by
emptying ice upon them.30
Finally while some courts refuse to apply the doctrine on the basis
of the possibility that the injury arose from a latent defect.3 1 that is, an
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) ; Pattison v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 333 Mich. 253, 52 N.W.2d 688 (1952).
21. Auzene v. Gulf Public Service Co., 181 So. 54 (La. App. 1938).
22. Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952) ; Hoffing
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App.2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948) ; Boykin v. Chase
Bottling Works, 32 Tenn. App. 518, 222 S.W.2d 889 (1949); Honea v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968 (1944); Benkendorfer v. Garrett, 143
S.W.2d 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
23. Hughes v. Miami Coca Cola Bottling Co., 155 Fla. 299, 19 So.2d 862 (1944);
Kees v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, 239 Mo. App. 1080, 199 S.W.2d 76 (1947).
24. Kees v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, 239 Mo. App. 1080, 199 S.W.2d 76 (1947).
25. Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952) ; Macres
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 290 Mich. 567, 287 N.W. 922 (1939).
26. Kees v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, 239 Mo. App. 1080, 199 S.W.2d 76 (1947).
27. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W. 778 (1926).
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. Boykin v. Chase Bottling Works, 32 Tenn. App. 518, 222 S.W.2d 889 (1949).
31. Slack v. Premier-Pabst Corp., 40 Del. 97, 5 A.2d 516 (1939) ; Stodder v.
Coca Cola Bottling Plants, 142 Me. 139, 48 A.2d 622 (1946).
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unavoidable accident, others reason that the mere possibility of a latent
defect is insufficient to prevent its application.82
III.
STANDARD OF CARE.
The duty of care owed the retailer and consumer by a defendant-
bottler is not a high standard of care even though issues of public health
might be argued,8 3 nor is the standard raised upon the basis of inherent
danger, which doctrine does not govern cases of exploding bottles.3 4 The
defendant, usually the bottler, must exercise that degree of care which an
ordinary prudent man would exercise under the circumstances. 5 Thus
even if a defect in the bottle be shown, it must be further shown that such
a defect would be discoverable through the exercise of ordinary care. 8 In
fashioning his product it is observed that the bottler need not be the first
to employ new precautions, but it is indicative of carelessness if he is the
last to lay the old aside. 7
If his beverage is such as will explode under sudden changes in
temperature, which is the exceptional case, or conversely necessitates a
gradual cooling, his duty includes warning those who would come into
contact with it, or taking other precautionary measures such as encasing the
bottle in wire mesh.88
The duty of care will, of course, depend upon the status of the person
injured. To the consumer and retailer his duty is one of ordinary care.3 9
A similar duty is owed an invitee, such as one touring his bottling plant 40
However, it was held in Vargas v. Blue Seal Bottling Works, 41 that proof
of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not aid a bare
licensee, to whom the owner owes only the duty of abstaining from wanton
and purposeful injury. As such, the plaintiff takes the premises as he
finds them.
32. Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 39 Cal.2d 436, 247 P.2d 344 (1952) ; Bradley
v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282, 118 P.2d 601 (1941).
33. Graham v. Clour, 30 Tenn. App. 306, 205 S.W.2d 764 (1948).
34. Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal. App. 674, 129 P.2d 485 (1942) ; O'Neill v. James, 138
Mich. 567, 101 N.W. 828 (1904); Graham v. Clour, 30 Tenn. App. 306, 205 S.W.2d
764 (1948) ; 21 TnINN. L. Rev. 334 (1950).
35. Hoffing v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App.2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948)
Cole v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 65 Ga. App. 204, 15 S.E.2d 543 (1941) ; Graham v.
Clour, 30 Tenn. App. 306, 205 S.W.2d 764 (1948).
36. Loebig's Guardian v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124, 81 S.W.2d 910
(1935) ; Coralnick v. Abbott's Dairies, 337 Pa. 334, 11 A.2d 143 (1940).
37. Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola Bottling Co., 176 N.C. 256, 97 S.E. 27 (1918).
38. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W. 778 (1926).
39. Hoffing v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App.2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948).
40. Vargas v. Blue Seal Bottling Works, 12 La. App. 652, 126 So. 707 (1930) ; 4
SYRACUSt'L. REv. 148 (1952).
41. 12 La. App. 652, 126 So. 707 (1930).
[VOL. 2.
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 4 [1957], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol2/iss4/5
JUNE 1957]
IV.
DEFENSES.
Of importance in determining whether the defendant has adhered to
his standard of care, are the tests employed in his plant before placing his
product on the market. Whether the bottler exercised due care to dis-
cover defects is decided by weighing the evidence as to the availability
of reasonable and practicable tests and their effectiveness against evidence
as to the actual tests employed by the defendant.4 It thus becomes apparent
that testimony concerning these tests is important both to the plaintiff and
to the defendant.
Initially the defendant will offer testimony as to the reputation of the
firm from which he purchases his bottles, and the tests which they employ.
But evidence of their tests is of less importance when the defendant re-uses
his containers, .for in such. instances he cannot rely upon the tests of the
manufacturer.4 The defendant will then point to his modern machinery
and in particular will introduce evidence as to the processes used in the
examination of the bottles and the regulatory gauges governing the insertion
of carbonic acid gas into the beverage. From these two sources (i.e., defec-
tive bottles, and excessive carbonation) most explosions result.
Evidence of the resistance of the bottles as compared with the pressure
used in the bottling process will be submitted. 44 Where feasible, a demon-
stration of the pressure gauges used in his plant will be introduced as
further evidence of the exercise of due care.45
Some of the tests utilized within the industry in order of their
popularity include:
1. Visual examination, which often takes place under a magnifying.
glass,
2. Pressure test,
3. Thermal test which reveals fatigue,
4. Polariscope test, capable of revealing deviations in the width of the
bottle walls.
46
Perhaps the most effective method of discovering defects in the anneal is
the immersion test in Which the bottle is submerged in iced water after
having been subjected to an increase in temperature. 47
The importance of such tests to the litigants is revealed when it is
recognized that if the defendant used machinery, methods, and processes
42. Loebig's Guardian v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 259 Ky. 124, 81 S.W.2d 910
(1933) ; Sweeney v. Blue Anchor Beverage Co., 325 Pa. 216, 189 Atl. 331 (1937).
43. Luciano v.. Morgan, 267 App. Div. 785, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 502 (2d Dep't 1943).
44. Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal. App. 674, 129 P.2d 485 (1942) ; Winifree v. Coca Cola
Bottling Works, 20 Tenn. App. 615, 103 S.W.2d 33 (1937).
45. Ibid.
46. Hoffing v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App.2d 371, 197 P.2d 56 (1948).
47. Torgesen v. Schultz, 192 N.Y. 156, 84 N.E. 956 (1908).
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accepted as standard in the trade, and which are as reliable and satisfactory
as others in detecting defects, there is no breach of his duty of care.48 The
bottler is not required to resort to impracticable methods in order to prevent
injury.411
V.
JURISDICTIONS LIMITING THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE.
Those jurisdictions refusing to apply res ipsa loquitur to cases in-
volving exploding bottles often reason along traditional lines in holding
that the control of the defendant-bottler was lacking at the time of the
casualty." Others point out that when management of the instrumentality
is divided among two or more agents, a plaintiff cannot invoke the doctrine
by disproving negligence on the part of all but one.51 This is in direct op-
position to the reasoning of courts which apply the doctrine despite the
lack of exclusive physical control on the part of the defendant.
A Delaware court, subsequently criticised in other jurisdictions, held
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable by applying the doctrine of
unavoidable accident, apparently equating explosions due to sudden tem-
perature changes with unavoidable accidents.5 2
Still other jurisdictions, such as Michigan, though they expressly
reject the doctrine, in effect follow the reasoning of those courts which
openly apply it. The Michigan courts maintain that the mere explosion
of a bottle will not give rise to an inference of negligence, but negligence
can be shown by circumstantial evidence; and when circumstances are such
as to take the case out of the realm of conjecture and place it in the realm
of legitimate inference, a prima facie case is made out." No jurisdiction
holds that the mere occurrence of the accident will suffice. Those which
apply the doctrine look to the peculiarity of the circumstances as indicative
of negligence.
54
In North Carolina, whereas the explosion of one bottle, whatever be
the circumstances, will not suffice to take the case to the jury, proof of
the explosion of other bottles placed in commerce by the defendant, which
occurred proximately in time and under similar circumstances will form
the basis for an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant. 55
48. Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal. App. 674, 129 P.2d 485 (1942); Sweeney v. Blue
Anchor Beverage Co., 325 Pa. 216, 189 Atl. 331 (1937).
49. Honea v. City Dairies Inc., 22 Cal.2d 614, 140 P.2d 369 (1943).
50. Slack v. Premier-Pabst Corp., 40 Del. 97, 5 A.2d 516 (1939); Stodder v.
Coca Cola Bottling Plants, 142 Me. 139, 48 A.2d 622 (1946) ; Wheeler v. Laurel
Bottling Works, 111 Miss. 442, 71 So. 743 (1916) ; Winifree v. Coca Cola Bottling
Works, 19 Tenn. App. 144, 83 S.W.2d 903 (1935).
51. Gerber v. Faber, 54 Cal. App. 674, 129 P.2d 458 (1942).
52. Slack v. Premier-Pabst Corp., 40 Del. 97, 5 A.2d 516 (1939).
53. Macres v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Mich. 567, 287 N.W. 922 (1939).
54. Payne v. Rome Coca Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E. 1087 (1912).
55. Davis v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 228 N.C. 32, 44 S.E.2d 337 (1947) ; Ash-
kenazi v. Nehi Bottling Co., 217 N.C. 552, 8 S.E.2d 818 (1940) ; Dail v. Taylor, 151
N.C. 284, 66 S.E. 135 (1909).
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Tennessee and Kentucky also apply this rule known as the North Carolina
Rule.5 6
The difficulty with which the plaintiff is confronted when res ipsa
loquitur is unavailable is appreciable. Even those courts which have stead-
fastly refused to apply the doctrine have recognized and allowed rather
strained inferences. As to the requirement of similar circumstances under
the North Carolina Rule, it has been held that evidence of an explosion
of a bottle upon its removal from a refrigerator is admissible in a suit
involving the explosion of a bottle wherein there was no issue of temperature
change.57
Quite frequently the bottle has burst into many fragments and is in-
capable of presenting any evidence as to causation. When sizeable frag-
ments have been salvaged, they have been examined by a micrometer in
seeking to discover variations in the thickness of the walls of the bottle.58
Whether the doctrine is available or not, the plaintiff generally will
allege that his injury resulted from defendant's negligently overcharging
the bottle, or from his failure to detect a defect in the glass. Even where
the doctrine is available, such allegations have not prevented it applica-
tion.5 9 It can be readily seen that in seeking to prove either of these
causes the plaintiff is confronted with evidentiary difficulties. His method
as to the overcharge usually consists of expert testimony as to the standard
regulatory processes in the industry. He proffers this in an effort to combat
defendant's anticipated testimony as to the tests employed in his plant.
Further, any inadequacies in defendant's plant with regard to the regula-
tion of pressure will be investigated. Even plaintiff's expert testimony
frequently fails to establish whether the explosion arose from an over-
charge of carbonic acid gas, or from a defect in the glass. The explosion
itself, which is often quite violent, renders it difficult to prove through an
examination of the fragments that the explosion resulted from a defect
in the glass.6° Should the defect be latent, there is no breach of defend-
ant's duty of care.6 1 When possible the plaintiff will introduce the tem-
perature at the time of the accident and the temperature of the factory dur-
ing the bottling process, since the liquid will admit more carbonic acid
gas at a lower temperature than at a higher temperature.
6 2
VI.
CONCLUSION.
Those jurisdictions in which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is deemed
inapplicable to cases involving exploding bottles justify their reluctance to
56. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Shelton, 214 Ky. 118, 282 S.W. 778 (1926).
Graham v. Clour, 30 Tenn. App. 306, 205 S.W.2d 764 (1948); Winifree v. Coca Cola
Bottling Works, 19 Tenn. App. 144, 783 S.W.2d 903 (1935).
57. Graham v. Clour, 30 Tenn. App. 306, 205 S.W.2d 764 (1948).
58. Gordon v. Nehi Beverage Co., 298 Ky. 836, 183 S.W.2d 795 (1944).
59. Boykin v. Chase Bottling Works, 32 Tenn. App. 518, 222 S.W.2d 889 (1949).
60. Lanza v. De Ridder Coca Cola Bottling Co., 3 So.2d 217 (La. App. 1941).
61. Cases cited note 36 supra.
62. Nolan v. Fach, 178 App. Div. 115, 164 N.Y. Supp. 1011 (2d Dep't 1917).
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apply the doctrine in an apprehension that should traditional safeguards
be eliminated, complete justice between the parties must suffer. This
position has been adhered to despite an awareness that the plaintiff is
laboring under a distinct evidentiary disadvantage. Consideration of the
interests of both parties suggests a test which could be resorted to in apply-
ing the doctrine to a novel situation. Does the requirement of calling upon
the plaintiff to disprove intervening causation when the injuring instru-
mentality has left the exclusive control of the defendant sufficiently safe-
guard the rights of both parties so as to justify the application of the
doctrine? An analysis of this test as applied to the circumstances would
tend to convince the court that the effect of the amelioration of the doc-
trine is not so severe as to deny its application.
John J. Collins
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